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    Justice Roberts’ America 
 
 
 
Less than a week after the Roberts Court issued its decision in National Federation of 
Independent Business v Sebelius, Jeffrey Toobin, writing in The New Yorker, compared the first 
part of Chief Justice John Roberts's opinion, in which he found that the Commerce Clause did 
not authorize Congress to enact the "individual mandate" section of the Affordable Care 
Act (ACA) that requires all individuals to buy health insurance, with an Ayn Rand screed, noting 
that the pivotal sections of the argument were long on libertarian rhetoric but short on citations of 
authority. Roberts held (although "held" might be stating it too strongly) that the Commerce 
Clause does not authorize Congress to regulate the inactivity of individuals — the "act" of not 
buying health insurance — even if that inactivity impacts interstate commerce. Rather, the 
Clause only authorizes congressional regulation where there is some activity of a commercial 
nature there to be regulated. Injecting a dose of libertarian and individualist thinking more 
typically associated with the Lochner-era's substantive due process jurisprudence into 
Commerce Clause reasoning, Roberts argued that the inactivity of not buying insurance is 
tantamount to doing nothing, and doing nothing cannot be characterized as commercial activity 
even if it has a commercial impact. 
Should inactivity, as opposed to activity, suffice to trigger congressional powers under the 
Commerce Clause, the result would be a slippery slope: if inactivity suffices for constitutional 
purposes, it is hard to imagine what does not suffice. Therefore, it is hard to establish the limits 
of Congress's power to regulate individual behavior. At the end of this slippery slope, as Justice 
Antonin Scalia also complained, Congress could presumably require us to buy broccoli in order 
to improve our diets, or to buy cars so as to save the auto industry or to pitch in and grow wheat 
in our back yards for resale so as to bring down the price of bread during a famine. Indeed, our 
individual lives could be regulated by Congress from "cradle to grave," Roberts complained — 
the bare fact of our existence, after all, has some impact on commerce. If Roberts's argument is 
taken to be authoritative, there are now limits on the Commerce Clause that protect our 
individual liberty not to do the sorts of commercial activities that might otherwise trigger the 
regulatory powers of the federal government --  although, importantly, this is not true of the state 
governments, whose police powers have no such limits. 
Toobin correctly notes that this pivotal move in Roberts's Commerce Clause argument — that 
Congress cannot regulate inactivity simply by virtue of its impact on interstate commerce — was 
made without reference to any authority. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, dissenting from this part 
of Roberts's decision, makes the same observation: although Roberts may be correct that the 
ACA is the first congressional act to ground its Commerce Clause authority in inactivity rather 
than activity, he cites no authority for the proposition that this is fatal to its constitutionality 
under the Commerce Clause. Neither Roberts nor Scalia provide precedent or argument for this 
claim, beyond their intuitions regarding the slippery slopes of cars, wheat and broccoli. That is 
likely because there is no such authority to cite. As Toobin and countless other commentators 
have suggested, there simply is no precedential authority for the claim that inactivity that impacts 
interstate commerce cannot be regulated, on the sole ground that it is inactivity rather than 
activity. From whence, then, comes this distinction between activity and inactivity? Why, 
 
 
 
Ginsburg asks in her dissent, is it so important to Roberts and Scalia that an individual's conduct 
must be capable of being characterized as activity, rather than inactivity, in order for its effects 
on commerce to justify congressional power? Why are we creating a cocoon around individual 
inactivity to protect it against the specter of federal legislators? Ginsburg leaves the question 
unanswered. 
But it is not unanswerable. I believe that what Ginsburg fails to note, and what other 
commentators likewise have missed, is precisely what Toobin mentions off-handedly in his 
piece: it is dystopic imagery, not precedent or argument, that drives this conviction that the 
Commerce Clause does not authorize the regulation of inactivity. If the government had its way, 
the "hale and hearty" individual's inactivity could trigger the federal government's nannyistic 
meddling with his life, and could do so from "cradle to grave." It could — and therefore 
presumably would — require him to buy broccoli "to improve [his] diets," to buy a car "to save 
Detroit," to grow wheat to drive up the price of endangered farms or whatever else the 
government gets in its collective head to require people to do in pursuit of its intrusive ends. The 
Randian individual who wants nothing so much as the freedom to choose not to participate in 
these collectivist projects would not be allowed his passive-aggressive atomism should the 
government's argument prevail. The opinions of both Roberts and Scalia turn repeatedly to this 
imagery of healthy individuals up against unduly paternalist legislators who are obsessed with 
the country's collective diet, driving habits and health. Given these self-evidently horrific images, 
there is little need for legalism, precedent or authority — the slippery slope speaks for itself. The 
Commerce Clause prong of the decision, then, rests at bottom on a vision, or as Roberts puts it at 
one point, on a view of our "Constitutional order" (in another telling passage, on the 
"Constitution's spirit"). The decision may be dictated by the rule of law, but it is not a "rule of 
law" that requires precedent, a law of rules, internal consistency or integrity. Rather, it is a rule 
of law that is bound to a particular interpretation of our constitutional order that protects the 
individual's isolationist inclinations over the federal government's unquenchable collectivist 
regulatory thirst. 
Given the rhetoric, and the force with which it is articulated, there is little that is puzzling about 
the details. It is not so puzzling, for example, that Roberts does not "explain" why he places 
weight on the distinction between activity and inactivity. The image of the government having 
the right to regulate every aspect of our lives solely because we are sitting in a chair doing 
nothing is compelling enough to trigger the Court's impulse to protect us against such a 
devouring source of centralized power. It is even less puzzling why Roberts is so untroubled by 
the "collective action" problem that prompted Congress to pass the mandate in the first place, 
and fails to grapple with it as marking a meaningful distinction between the mandate and his 
parade of horribles. According to the government's argument, given community pricing and the 
requirement that insurers provide services to those with pre-existing conditions, without a 
mandate requiring healthy individuals to purchase insurance, such individuals will choose not to 
insure unless and until they become sick. This will drive up the price of care and premiums, both 
for them and the rest of us. Against the backdrop of the Court's rhetoric, this hardly counsels for 
the constitutionality of the ACA. Rather, the dragooning of the "inactive individual" as a 
conscripted soldier against a "collective action" problem that besets the masses is the 
constitutional horror. That there is a "collective action problem" here ironically underscores the 
constitutional infirmity with its solution. 
 
 
 
So the rhetoric in this section is powerful; so powerful as to take the argumentative place of 
precedent. But does it matter? Are Roberts and Scalia's Randian constitutional musings of any 
consequence? The mandate was, after all, upheld as a fully constitutional tax by the same Court 
and in the same case, under Congress’s taxing power. Roberts's rhetorical excoriation of the 
mandate for its attempt to dragoon the inactive individual into collective action against his will 
is, technically, dicta; because the mandate is upheld on other grounds, the Court's discovery of 
this limit to the reach of the Commerce Clause is not logically necessary to the outcome. The 
entire discussion may also be inconsequential for a second reason: there are few instances in 
which Congress seeks to regulate inactivity by "mandating" the purchase of a product. Counsel 
for both sides were hard pressed to come up with any additional examples, or even hypotheticals, 
beyond the ACA's mandate itself. As several commentators have noted, the restrictions 
suggested by their dicta on the reach of the Commerce Clause might be more than compensated 
by the expansive reading of the taxing power endorsed by Roberts and the four liberal Justices in 
the Court's holding: if a regulatory end that targets inactivity cannot be sustained through the 
Commerce Clause, perhaps it can be sustained as a tax, even if it is not called that (at least if 
there are penalties attached for the non-complying inactivity, and if the penalties are collected by 
the Internal Revenue Service). Perhaps, then, given the overriding narrative — that this 
conservative Court ultimately upheld the constitutionality of a major new social welfare initiative 
— the liberal handwringing over Roberts's and Scalia's essays on Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence are misguided. Their anti-welfarist libertarian musings are just of no consequence. 
Nevertheless, even if it is "just rhetoric," rhetoric from high sources matters. The rhetoric in the 
Commerce Clause section of Roberts's opinion in this case in particular matters hugely, and for 
two reasons. 
First, Roberts's finding, albeit in dicta, that individuals must be free to not participate in the 
nation's attempt to provide health coverage for the working poor obliquely suggests the contours 
of a newly recognized individual right: a right to be free of federal regulation of one's inactivity, 
even where that inactivity negatively impacts societal and commercial ends. Because the federal 
government has no power to regulate such individual inactivity, the individual has the right to his 
inactivity free of the specter of undue federal regulation, even if that inactivity proves deleterious 
to nationally defined social efforts to resolve society-wide economic problems. That new "right 
to inactivity", in short, neatly exemplifies what I believe to be an emerging rights paradigm on 
the conservative right, both on and off the Court, which I have elsewhere called "exit rights": the 
rights of individuals to exit the webs of mutual obligation and shared responsibility that 
collectively constitute civil society. Exit rights are rights, in effect, to exit the changing and 
shifting obligations of the social compact. Federation of Business v Sebelius explicitly articulates 
the grounds for such rights, even without naming them: the Constitution defines a government of 
limited and enumerated powers and individual citizens must not be subjected to centralized 
overbearing authority. Given those premises, the federal government has no power, in the guise 
of regulating commerce, to order the participation of hale and hearty individuals in federally 
conceived and funded social welfare programs. The individual has a right, then, where the 
government has no power to command otherwise, to not obtain health insurance for himself, 
even if doing so is irrational, doing otherwise would contribute to the collective health of the 
polity and his refusal to do so raises the cost of health coverage for all. Stated positively and 
 
 
 
more generally, the individual has the right to "exit" a collective attempt to resolve a civic 
problem through the democratic levers of civil society. 
The right to exit obliquely recognized here is not unlike other recently conceived (or 
dreamt of) libertarian rights. It is structurally similar, for example, to the express right the Court 
created from the Second Amendment in their decisions in District of Columbia v. 
Heller and McDonald v. Chicago: an individual right to defend oneself with lethal force, and to 
thereby withdraw from, or exit, the collective, civic delegation to police forces of the work of 
protecting us all from social violence. The Court declared in those cases that the individual has a 
"right" to provide his own protection against the violence of others, and to use lethal force if 
need be against intruders. Thus, by virtue of those decisions, the individual now has the right to 
"exit" from those parts of the Hobbesian and Lockean social compact by which we delegate to 
police forces both the power and the responsibility to protect us. By virtue of this decision in 
Federation of Business v. Sebelius, the individual also has the right to exit the compact by which 
we collectively defray the health related costs of ourselves and co-citizens through insurance 
programs. Along similar lines, libertarian, religious and social conservative parents' groups over 
the last few decades have fervently struggled to articulate a right of parents to withdraw from the 
shared civic project of public education and educate their children at home. That effort has had 
considerable success, both with lower federal courts and with state legislatures. 
These new rights — a right to lethal self defense and to own the means to carry it out, a 
right not to buy insurance where doing so would resolve a collective health care crisis and a right 
to "home school" free of all state regulation — collectively suggest the imagining of a new rights 
paradigm. They are not just liberal rights of self-expression. They are radically and, I believe, 
deeply tragic anti-collectivist rights to exit core parts of the civic compact, usually by inactivity 
— not buying insurance, not sending one's children to school, not surrendering the means of 
one's own self protection to a police force — that undermines, sometimes near fatally, the civic 
attempt to solve collective problems collectively through the project of government. The children 
in public schools suffer when the parents of over two million children claim a right to 
"homeschool," thereby justifying diminished resources for education and sacrificing parental and 
communal good will. All of us, including the police, are endangered by the proliferation of 
weaponry among citizens when half the country is armed. And the insured, as well as uninsured, 
are impoverished by the refusal of the healthy to participate in an insurance mandate that would 
reduce costs for all. 
These exit rights, unlike liberal rights of self-expression and autonomy, are protective not 
of individuals' inclinations toward expression and political participation, but rather of 
individuals' inclinations toward isolation and atomism. This protection exacts an often extreme 
cost from not only particular collectivist ends, but to the idea of governance itself. The rhetoric in 
this opinion, even if dicta, matters because it explicitly gives these rights the imprimatur of 
constitutionality, as envisioned by the highest Court of the land. As Ronald 
Dworkin noted nearly half a century ago, the conception or understanding of individual rights 
that is embraced by the Supreme Court at any particular moment — whether they be civil rights 
of nondiscrimination, political rights of democratic participation, liberal rights of free speech, 
assembly, autonomy, or reproductive freedoms, or, as here, what I call "exit rights" that insulate 
atomistic individuals from collectivist projects, including the projects of co-insurance, public 
 
 
 
education or state-provided police protection — can reshape a country in profound and enduring 
ways. 
Second, charged political rhetoric from Supreme Court justices, even in dicta, matters, because 
that dicta purports to authoritatively state, on the basis of the Constitution, who we are and what 
we can and cannot do as a nation. The Court's answer to this question of national identity 
particularly matters where, as here, its answer, ostensibly driven by the dictates of the 
Constitution in turn drafted by the metaphorical "We the People," is so radically at odds with the 
vision implied by the actual will of the people as expressed through the representative branches 
of government. In this case, that incompatibility is manifest: the mandate, enacted by a 
democratically elected branch, after a presidential and congressional campaign that focused 
squarely on the issue for many months, expresses quite clearly the people's conviction that free 
riders in health insurance markets can and should be made to contribute to the cost of their own 
care, while the Court expresses quite clearly its view that no such mandate should be issued. 
Roberts held that this law of the people, a law that had the audacity to require that 
individuals obtain health insurance so as to help defray general health care costs, violated the 
letter and spirit of the Constitution. According to this opinion, the will to do that — the will to 
enact such a law, demanding the mutual shouldering of costs — was at odds with who we 
constitutionally are, and when that happens, democratic deliberation and its product must fall to 
the imperative demands of our adjudicated constitutional identity. Who we are, as adjudged by 
this authoritative judicial rendering, is a country that cannot or will not collectively regulate the 
health industry, so as to protect the weaker among us, even should we want to and even should 
we decide to do just that. Who we are, according to the constitutional order envisioned by 
Roberts, is a country that must protect the atomistic contrarian decisions of the hale and hearty, 
even though they did not prevail at the ballot box, and even though, to borrow the artful language 
of Ginsburg's powerful dissent, we thereby sacrifice the health of the working people whose 
labor supports us all. It is important to note, however, that we the people did not author this 
particular self-portrait. 
